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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
After objectively reviewing the record in this case, appointed appellate counsel 
have concluded that there are no non-frivolous issues that can be raised on appeal, and 
move to withdraw. Appellate counsel have advised Appellant of this conclusion, and 
provided Appellant with a copy of this brief. 
After giving Appellant time to raise any issues he wished to, Appellant has 
indicated that he wishes to raise the following claims before this Court: 
1. That the damaging jails statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418, violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution on its face because it 
misclassifies damaging jails as a third degree felony level offense, thereby 
1 
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providing for maximum penalties which are constitutionally disproportionate 
to the culpability underlying the crime of damaging a jail; 
2. That the damaging jails statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418, violates the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to Appellant 
because the statute's classification of attempted damaging a jail as a class A 
misdemeanor was disproportionate to Appellant's culpability in willfully and 
intentionally breaking a sprinkler head at the Utah County Jail; 
3. That the factual basis supporting Appellant's guilty plea was insufficient to 
meet the elements of attempted damaging a jail under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
418; 
4. That Appellant was justified in committing the crime of damaging a jail under 
the forcible felony doctrine; 
5. That Appellant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because trial 
counsel failed to advise Appellant that he would waive all nonjurisdictional 
defects in his conviction by pleading guilty; 
6. That Appellant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because Appellant 
was denied access to computer resources at the Utah County Jail that were 
necessary for Appellant to effectively communicate his desire to withdraw his 
guilty plea to trial counsel and to the District Court; 
7. That the District Court erred by failing to allow Appellant an adequate 
opportunity to present mitigating factors at sentencing; 
8. That trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the 
i 
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District Court's failure to allow Appellant an adequate opportunity to present 
mitigating factors at sentencing; and 
9. That the District Court abused its discretion in sentencing Appellant to 24 
months probation, 30 days jail, and a $740 fine because that sentence was 
disproportionate to the relatively minor damage Appellant caused to the jail. 
After reviewing the above issues, appointed appellate counsel have determined 
that these issues are also frivolous. Nevertheless, where appointed appellate counsel 
move to withdraw after having determined that there are no non-frivolous issues that can 
be raised on appeal, counsel must objectively demonstrate that any potentially 
meritorious issues raised are actually frivolous. State v. Wickward, 2011 UT App 379, f^ 
1, 264 P.3d 781; see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Adam Palombi appeals the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Honorable 
David N. Mortensen, Fourth District Court, after his conviction for attempted damaging a 
jail, a class A misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Adam Palombi was charged by criminal information filed May 20, 2011 with 
damaging a jail, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418. R. 3-
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2. The probable cause statement supporting the information alleged that Palombi broke a 
sprinkler head in his cell at the Utah County Jail on May 12, 2011. R. 3. 
At arraignment on May 26, 2011, Palombi pled guilty to attempted damaging a 
jail, a class A misdemeanor. R. 16-15. At sentencing on August 4, 2011, the District 
Court placed Palombi on court-supervised probation for 24 months. R. 25. As a 
condition of probation, the Court ordered Palombi to serve 30 days jail concurrently with 
any other sentence. R. 26. The Court also ordered Palombi to pay a $740 fine, and to 
complete a thinking errors class after his release from jail. R. 25. 
Palombi filed a timely notice of appeal on August 30, 2011. R. 29. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The State recited the following factual basis in support of Palombi's guilty plea at 
arraignment: 
Your Honor on May 12, 2011 the defendant was incarcerated in the Utah County 
Jail. He intentionally broke a sprinkler head in the jail cell causing damage to the 
jail. 
R.32:6. 
OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED 
After objectively reviewing the record in this case, appointed appellate counsel 
have determined that there are no non-frivolous issues that can be raised on appeal. 
Counsel have also determined that all nine claims raised by Palombi, outlined above in 
the ''Issues Presented and Standards of Review" section of this brief, are frivolous for the 
reasons given below. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1. CLAIMS 1-6 ARE BARRED BECAUSE PALOMBI DID NOT MOVE TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
Claims 1-6 outlined above allege nonjurisdictional defects in Palombi's underlying 
conviction. These claims are barred because Palombi entered a guilty plea, and did not 
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Utah Code section 77-13-6 requires that a defendant file a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea before sentence is announced. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2012). If 
the defendant fails to timely file a motion to withdraw his plea, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider any claim except a challenge to the sentence itself.1 State v. 
Clark, 2011 UT App 344,H 2 n. 1, 263 P.3d 1222; State v. Navarro, 2010 UT App 302, «J 
2, 243 P.3d 519; State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, fflf 13-20, 114 P.3d 585. This 
jurisdictional bar is in place even if Appellant's failure to move to withdraw his plea is 
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Williams, 2011 UT App 402, f 2, 
266 P.3d 196; State v. Lee, 2011 UT App 356, *h 2, 264 P.3d 239; State v. Rhinehart, 
2007 UT 61,1| 14, 167 P.3d 1046. 
Thus, because Palombi failed to timely move to withdraw his plea, this Court does 
not have jurisdiction to consider claims 1-6. On this basis, appellate counsel have 
determined that these claims are objectively frivolous. 
1
 To the extent that claims 1-2 could be construed as attacks on the constitutionality of 
Palombi's sentence, these claims are also barred. See State v. Davie, 2011 UT App 380, f 
22, 264 P.3d 770 (unpreserved challenge to the constitutionality of a sentence as cruel 
and unusual could not be raised on direct appeal); State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, | 7, 48 
P.3d 228 (unpreserved claim that appellant's sentence was unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment where appellant alleged that the underlying offense was misclassified 
as a first degree felony was actually an attack on the underlying conviction, and could not 
be raised under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)). 
5 
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IL CLAIMS 7-8 ARE FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD. 
In claims 7-8 outlined above, Palombi alleges that the District Court judge failed 
to allow Palombi an adequate opportunity to present mitigating factors at sentencing.2 
"Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any 
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (2012); see 
State v. Brooks, 2012 UT App 34, Iffi 13-18. After objectively reviewing the record, 
appellate counsel have determined that claims 7-8 are frivolous because they are not 
supported in the record. 
Palombi and trial counsel both presented mitigating factors at sentencing. Trial 
counsel argued to the District Court judge that Adult Probation and Parole had 
misclassified Palombi's criminal history. R. 33:3-4. Trial counsel also argued that Adult 
Probation and Parole had inappropriately elevated its jail recommendation because 
Palombi had been disruptive at the Utah County Jail. R. 33:5-6. 
After the State responded to counsel's arguments, The District Court judge asked, 
"Mr. Palombi, is there anything you'd like to tell the court?" R. 33:9. Palombi then 
argued to the District Court judge that 365 days in jail would be excessive, given that 
2
 Claim 7, which alleges that the District Court failed to allow Palombi an adequate 
opportunity to present mitigating factors, depends on claim 8, which alleges ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Since a challenge to Palombi's opportunity to present mitigating 
factors at sentencing was not preserved at the District Court, this Court could not 
consider the issue without an allegation of plain error, exceptional circumstances, or 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, 253 P.3d 1082; State 
v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, f 13, 129 P.3d 282. 
c 
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Palombi would be required to pay a substantial fee for each day he spent in jail on a 
misdemeanor conviction. R. 33:9. The District Court judge then interrupted Palombi, 
and advised that he intended to sentence Palombi to only 30 days jail, and that Palombi 
would not be charged any fee for these days because he was being separately held on a 
felony charge. R. 33:9-10. 
Palombi then asked, "Could I finish speaking now?" R. 33:9. The District Court 
judge answered, "Sure. I'm just telling you I don't need to hear why you don't want to 
spend 365." R. 33:9-10. Palombi responded "All right." R. 33:10. 
Palombi then alleged that the cost to the Utah County Jail of fixing the sprinkler 
head Palombi had broken would be relatively minor, and argued that a $740 fine would 
be excessive because it would be disproportionate to Palombi's culpability. R. 33:10. 
The District Court judge then interrupted Palombi again, and advised that the purpose of 
the fine was not restitution, but to convey the message that Palombi's conduct in breaking 
the sprinkler head was unacceptable. R. 33:11. 
Palombi answered "All right. And I understand that." R. 33:11. Palombi then 
argued that he did not have a history of breaking sprinkler heads in jails. R. 33:11. 
Palombi further argued that some of the jail deputies were treating him poorly, and that 
conditions at the jail were generally bad. R. 33:11-12. Finally, Palombi argued that he 
was under a lot of stress because he was facing very serious charges in a separate case. 
R. 33:12. 
After Palombi concluded his argument, the District Court pronounced sentence. 
R. 33:12-14. Neither Palombi or his counsel objected or in any way alleged that Palombi 
7 
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had not been given an adequate opportunity to raise mitigating factors. After the District 
Court judge finished pronouncing sentence, Palombi stated, "So I can appeal that, right?" 
R. 33:17. The District Court judge responded in the affirmative. R. 33:13-14. 
After objectively reviewing these facts, appellate counsel have concluded that 
Palombi's claim that the District Court judge did not afford an adequate opportunity to 
present mitigating factors at sentencing is arguably supported by the fact that the District 
Court judge twice interrupted Palombi while Palombi was presenting mitigating factors. 
Cf Brooks, 2012 UT App 34 at ^ 16 (trial court afforded defendant an adequate 
opportunity to present mitigating factors in part because trial court did not interrupt or cut 
off defendant's presentation). 
However, appellate counsel have determined that, despite this arguable fact, 
claims 7-8 are objectively frivolous. Although the District Court judge twice interrupted 
Palombi's presentation, the interruptions appear to have been for clarification, and the 
judge allowed Palombi to continue after interrupting him until he was finished. The 
judge did not cut short Palombi's presentation, and there is no indication that Palombi or 
his counsel attempted to present additional mitigating factors and were denied the 
opportunity to do so. 
In sum, after an objective review of the record, appellate counsel cannot argue in 
good faith that the District Court judge's two interruptions during Palombi's presentation 
of mitigating factors give rise to a colorable claim that Palombi was not afforded an 
adequate opportunity to present mitigating factors at sentencing. For this reason, 
appellate counsel have determined that claims 7-8 arc frivolous. 
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III. CLAIM 9 IS FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE THE RECORD INDICATES THAT 
DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN PRONOUNCING 
SENTENCE. 
Issue 9 outlined above alleges that the District Court abused its discretion in 
sentencing Palombi to 24 months court probation, 30 days jail, a $740 fine, and a 
thinking errors class. Appellate counsel have determined that this issue is also frivolous 
because the record indicates that the District Court was within its discretion in 
pronouncing sentence. 
"In general, a trial court's sentencing decision will not be overturned unless it 
exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all legally relevant 
factors, or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion." State v. Loyo, 2011 UT App 357,12, 264 P.3d 561. 
At sentencing, Adult Probation and Parole recommended to the District Court that 
Palombi serve 365 days in jail, pay a $740 fine, pay a $250 recoupment fee, and pay 
restitution as determined by the Utah County Attorney. R. 27. Palombi argued several 
mitigating factors, and in particular argued that a $740 fine would be disproportionate to 
the relatively minor damage that Palombi caused at the jail. R. 33:10. 
After considering argument by trial counsel, the State, and Palombi, the District 
Court sentenced Palombi to 24 months court supervised probation, 30 days jail, a $740 
fine, and a thinking errors class. R. 33:12-14. The District Court ordered the jail 
sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence. R. 33:13. The District Court 
struck the recoupment fee and restitution recommended by Adult Probation and Parole. 
R. 33:13. 
9 
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Viewing the record objectively, the District Court's sentence was well below the 
statutory maximum sentence for a class A misdemeanor, which is 365 days in jail and a 
$2,500 fine. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-204 and 76-3-301. The District Court's sentence 
was also a significant downward departure from the recommendation of Adult Probation 
and Parole. See R. 27. The District Court considered Palombi's argument that a $740 
fine would be disproportionate to the damage caused. R. 33:10. Appellate counsel 
cannot locate any place in the record that would arguably support a claim that the judge 
failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or that the judge's actions were inherently 
unfair. 
Appellate counsel also cannot locate in the record any evidence that would 
arguably support Palombi's contention that the cost of replacing the broken sprinkler head 
was minor. Furthermore, even if the cost of replacing the sprinkler head were minor, 
appellate counsel can locate no legal authority that would support Palombi's contention 
that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing Palombi to pay a fine that was 
disproportionate to the cost of the damage Palombi caused, where the fine was well 
below the statutory limit. 
Thus, after having objectively reviewed the record, appellate counsel have 
concluded that raising a claim that the District Court abused its discretion in sentencing 
Palombi to 24 months probation, 30 days jail, a $740 fine, and a thinking errors class 
would be wholly frivolous. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are no non-frivolous issues that can be raised on appeal, and the issues 
raised by Appellant are wholly frivolous. Therefore, appointed appellate counsel 
respectfully move to withdraw. Counsel have advised Appellant that he may supplement 
this brief with any written responses, which counsel will submit to this Court on 
Appellant's behalf. 
DATED this ^ d a y of March, 2012. 
/^fe^-^r-^^^g^ZZZ) 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
MATTHEW R. MORRISE 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Anders Brief to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 2^_ day of March, 2012. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
